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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID FRANKLIN YOUNG, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
Case No. 890424 
Priority No. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant David Franklin Young relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and the 
summary of the argument. Mr. Young replies to the State's response 
to his opening brief as follows. Issues not discussed in this reply 
brief were adequately analyzed in Mr. Young's opening brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are 
contained in Addendum A to Appellant's opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I (Shackles) 
Necessity is required in order to justify shackling a 
capital defendant during the penalty phase of his trial. The fact 
that the defendant has been convicted of a homicide is not 
sufficient to justify such an extreme measure. Necessity did not 
exist in this case since there was no evidence of threats by 
Mr. Young to disrupt the proceedings, engage in violence, or 
escape. In the absence of such necessity, shackling Mr. Young part 
way through the penalty phase coupled with the failure to give the 
requested cautionary instruction created an overwhelming prejudice 
which requires a new penalty hearing. 
Point II (Media Exposure) 
The trial court's failure to rule as to whether the 
publicity was prejudicial was contrary to established law of this 
Court. Although the appropriate remedy where a trial judge fails to 
make this initial determination is not clear from case law, at the 
very least, this Court should remand the matter for an evidentiary 
hearing. Any publicity regarding the details of the shackling 
hearing or any suggestion that the court believed Mr. Young might be 
dangerous to persons in the courtroom, along with any other 
publicity which covered matters not before the jury, would be highly 
prejudicial regardless of whether the judge's decision to shackle 
Mr. Young was proper. 
Point III (Statement to Sentencer) 
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether 
denying a request by a defendant to speak at sentencing violates due 
process. Case law acknowledging such a due process right exists and 
requires reversal where the defendant is denied the opportunity to 
address the sentencing body after making a request to do so. In 
addition, as the State acknowledges, the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require that a defendant be permitted to speak to the 
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Iiudqe or jury that decides whether to -.entente hiir s 
Finally, I.he eighth riiiMiHliiK.nl i IJI|II i L * s . t*.. : -4 ,a 1 
cases. Although the State did not directly Address th< eighth 
amendment argument in it*, response, I I importance of i. ' lotion 
evidence, as repeatedly acknuwJedgeu JII vase law, requires tha' this 
important mitigation be presented to the sentencer. 
J'oint IV" (Mercy) 
" M e r q " i* important mitigation ir. * capital case. The 
failure to : rrurt t.- - ~ury d u r m u • penalty phase* that I t could 
cons it lor mei .*»«- - - . », [•*• - .-. , y • - -• • mi s] ead i ng 
nature of th* dr-r i - sympathy instruction, reqnir-M a new penalty 
hearing. 
,L.^-^ - __:_,JIJreiii--^ 1^ Fi^dbt insiruciions) 
The penal4" ; \^ ** .t .ructions failed to i :- lately guide 
uxie ** A though * - * it - .1 *^nt. * t 
recognized tna' . leicauoni ;,as *^ n eighth amendment right • b^ ye 
"residual doubts** i^ *o the guilt considered by the urv , - rie J'ourt 
i 
important mitigation under their statutes ,i institutions, i *-ih 
statutory scheme and Articl e 1 section - -f :t^ c o n s t i t u t i ^ require 
1 1 riqei: I . t: :> 
r culpability :* assessing punishment in a capital case. 
Point VI (Penalty Phase Instruction Number 2) 
Due • • - and the eighth amendment require t . - • ,.: 
judge adequate: .• nstruct the sentencing jury, and carefully qiide 
<. 11"!d c h a n n e 1 * !")od >' i 11 . i s s t » s s i n i | I I 
sentence. Letting the jury decide whether guilt phase instructions 
are applicable fails to meet these constitutional requirements. 
Point VII (Reasonable Doubt Instructions—Penalty Phase) 
The reasonable doubt instructions given during the penalty 
phase failed to define the concept for the jury. Recent United 
States Supreme Court case law emphasizes the importance of 
reasonable doubt instructions in a capital case and requires that a 
new penalty hearing be held in this case. 
Point XII fGuiltv and Mentally 111) 
The Utah Insanity Defense Act does not require that a 
defendant plead not guilty by reason of insanity or claim a defense 
of diminished capacity in order to submit a verdict form of guilty 
and mentally ill to the jury. A guilty and mentally ill defendant 
who knows that the evidence will establish his capacity to have the 
required intent should not be required to plead a legal fiction of 
insanity or claim diminished capacity as a defense in order to 
present the evidence of mental illness or have a verdict form of 
guilty and mentally ill presented to the jury. Where the evidence 
supports a finding of mentally ill, such verdict form should be 
presented to the jury. 
Failure to give the jury the option of finding the 
defendant guilty and mentally ill requires a new trial and penalty 
hearing because important mitigation is not presented to the jury as 
the result of such failure. In addition, the United States Supreme 
Court has not decided whether a state can execute a defendant who 
was mentally ill at the time he committed the crime; Mr. Young 
- 4 -
maintains that such an executi on is not appropriate. 
Point XIV fPr osecutor *s comments) 
Comments by tl le prosecutor and testimony as to other 
"Science which war n^f admitted permeated the entire proceedinqs, 
suggesi . • a^- .. evidence m addi tion to that; wliiuli 
was admitted existec The efloc- of this erroneous commentary and 
evidence • -- *~\ * 
Point XVIII (Jury Panel) 
The trial court's failure *<• to] low i r<e la* regarding the 
11 J i V selection p r o c <-j s s r e s u 11 e d i t: i 
represent a fair cross section of the ronununi ty , 
Point XX (Defense Challenges for Cause) 
r
 lurors for 
cause. This Court's repeated no ding that requiring \ criminal 
defendant -f?orPr^^., , K ] ] e n c K * w.*r:-vr - shou] d 
have beer re.*. > - • ^a~^r. . c ...t attected by the decision of the 
United States -upreme Court in Ross v. Oklahoma, _ _ U S . _, 108 
Point XXI (State's Challenge for Cause) 
The trial court emitted reversible error r- removing 
J 1 i:t: or Hoffilial in for sai i * _* i «,« : e 1: ler vi ews i ; :: 
substantial! y impair performance of her duties as a mr^r *nd any 
hormonal difficulties she may have had did not amoor* *^ a mental or 
physical i mpa I r mei :i t: ""w 1: li ch "w oi ill i pr ec.] i i :l<= 1 i . a *<* ,* iuror. 
Point XXIII (Reasonable Doubt Instruction—Gijiilt) 
Cage \r__ Lou isiana, 498 U. S . _ 3 1 ] S Ct. _____ 
L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), decided by the United States Supreme Court after 
Mr. Young filed his opening brief, supports Mr. Young's argument 
that the incorrect reasonable doubt instruction in this case 
requires a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SHACKLING MR. YOUNG AND REFUSING TO 
GIVE A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW 
PENALTY PHASE. 
As Mr. Young argued in his opening brief, the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments require that there be a necessity under the 
facts of a particular case in order to justify the use of restraints 
during the penalty phase of a capital trial. See Appellant's 
opening brief at 36; Elledae v. Ducrcrer, 823 F.2d 1439, 1452 (11th 
Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988). The delicate nature 
of the penalty phase, the importance of mitigation evidence, and the 
overwhelming prejudice of shackling a defendant all require that 
shackling be justified by necessity during the penalty as well as 
guilt phase of a capital trial. See generally Holbrook v. Flvnn, 
475 U.S. 560, 568-9, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986); Elledae, 
823 F.2d at 1450. Although Mr. Young acknowledges that, under some 
extreme circumstances, necessity requiring the use of shackles 
during the penalty phase of a capital trial may exist, his argument 
is that no such necessity existed in the present case. 
In State v. Farrar, 786 P.2d 161, 178 (Or. 1990), cited by 
the state on page 29 of its brief, the Oregon Supreme Court, without 
- 6 -
citing any cases, held that restraining t - defendar.i - j *•••;•, 
•ippar-' n t . • .
 : * . .  • . 1 n 
reaching its decisic., . *,* -,• .1 ? emphasized tha - \- .-m*-r rent's 
hands were not restrained and focused on ne evtensi*^ «videncp of 
i i w w\\ mi i ill I illiI i - fdrrar, 
-.-. scate submitted s-- affidavits audi a signed statement wnic 
indicated tha* *} ^ defendant had threatened to disrupt the 
* 1 I I In (inJqo, INS own .:ittorhneys, the prosecutors, 
•; * t nessec- Ij, at 178. 
By contrast, in f ho present casp time trial judge 
restra ined Mr lorn ig s hands par t way through the penalty phase even 
though there was no evidence of threats to disrupt the proceedings, 
engaa :li it i :i o,]l <= .1 ice :: r • escape. 
In Duckett v» State. 752 P.2d 75? (Nev 198R), the court-
held that 1:ti* trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring 
Mi**' ill If-mim" ' ai-pM,! n, |,i i
 1 i, i{,nl . II . I m.-maLled toi thu penalty 
phase of his trial "The court noted that, in exercising such 
discretion, the trial judge must balance the state's interest i Mi 
courtroom "against the interest in 
Preventing prejudju^ t •:> defendant." Id. at 755, In Duckett, 
tlio defendant was :r. jji^ xea throughout I nm peiidlr
 ( r...isp •• 
tidt. uie ol his convictions; the decision was npt made after extensive 




 " '" i if i I . n i c k e l ,1. w II11 c 11 ; •><• ". i) 
shackles based solely oi i the conviction for violent micide af : 
absent any evidence of threats or potential violence during the 
proceedings offers an unhealthy precedent to this Court in capital 
cases. This Court has acknowledged the overwhelming prejudice of 
requiring a defendant to appear in prison garb. See Chess v. Smith, 
617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980). Shackling a defendant during a 
penalty phase of a capital trial where the defendant's life is at 
stake presents the same type of overwhelming prejudice. See 
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986) (recognizing that 
shackling a defendant is inherently prejudicial). 
In the penalty phase, where only a single juror must be 
convinced that death is not the appropriate penalty, the use of 
restraints may well change the decision of a juror who might 
otherwise vote for life. See Elledcre, 823 F.2d at 1452. 
The State cites Gates v. Zant. 863 F.2d 1492, 1501 (11th 
Cir. 1989), for the proposition that a "defendant is not entitled to 
a new penalty hearing absent a showing of prejudice." State's brief 
at 29.1 
The record in the present case fails to establish that 
shackling Mr. Young was a necessity. The State is correct that, on 
the third day of trial, defense counsel made a record of Mr. Young's 
desire to testify immediately. R. 1035:3-5. The trial judge then 
allowed Mr. Young to address the court; in a disjointed statement, 
1. Gates involved the use of a videotaped confession in which the 
defendant was shown in handcuffs; it did not involve the use of 
shackles at trial. The fact that the defendant had been handcuffed 
during interrogation but was unrestrained during trial may well have 
worked in his favor. By contrast, in the present case, the shackles 
appeared part way through the penalty phase, suggesting that 
Mr. Young had done something violent or dangerous and therefore 
causing inherent prejudice to Mr. Young. 
- 8 -
Young then questioner ~* tppropri at^ps^ ! *P «*-: xE 
answer Mr. Young's questions and explain the iegal effect D£ mental 
health evident* n ^  * •? ~ » ^ *~ then tolu wi. IUU- u 
/,j a : •au-.ual health and consider 
them regara T "Jecisioi * - ether 
sugg6wi.Lv; think . 'j.tr lu i^stity, - u-ig also 
complacently agreed with *! judge tha* r vas trup ** aat nothing was 
-* :>r • 
belies the S; - suggestion xn^t . iecisjor ^acK.e ^* ^jm 
first voiced _. _ ^ raidst, w^ uiii attempt by /"--reliant lu aisrupt 
. uceed i ngs 
Although the trial judge did find that "ilm ifi use counsel for 
whatever reason decided not ftol take \n\ additional precout ion*- for 
in ii.i'ut' fi mil" any unrig else iu uiock the potential view 01 the jury uli 
the defendant's shackles" (R, 043:120-1), such a finding should not 
affect this Pnurt's resmIut inn nl Mil" i , lie Pi I in | booh i ii limil 
of Mr Young would not obstruct the vision of jurors who move In and 
out of the courtroom while the defendant is at counsel table; 
I l i f t - h i e r • • • 
call dttentii . . Young and suggest that his attorneys wer-
trying to hide t^ ackles, ther^hv emphasizing ^hp importance and 
|M"P jud i -. * - i 
ability \o write notes to counsv durr»>; "ie hearing would stilJ be 
impeded, and covering counsel tabie WJ** [I.I 
which is generally occupied by necessary defense materials and a pad 
of paper for the defendant to take notes and write communications to 
counsel. A stack of books on counsel table would not have undone 
the inherent prejudice in this situation. 
Finally, in addition to necessity as a prerequisite for the 
use of restraints, case law requires a cautionary instruction where 
such restraints are, in fact, used. Without such an instruction, 
the jurors in all likelihood concluded that Mr. Young had engaged in 
threatening or violent behavior of which they were unaware. 
Both Elledae v. Duqqer. 823 F.2d 1439, 1453 (11th Cir. 
1987), cert, denied, U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 
(1988), and Tvars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1284-5 (9th Cir. 1983), 
support Mr. Young's argument that a cautionary instruction is 
necessary where restraints are used. See also Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 305 N.E.2d 830, 836-7 (Mass. 1973). 
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
POLL THE JURY. 
The trial judge acknowledged that media coverage of the 
case had occurred, but refused to consider the matter further 
because defense counsel did not establish that the jurors had been 
exposed to the reports. R. 1044:12-13. The trial judge's summary 
resolution of the issue was contrary to established case law wherein 
this Court has acknowledged that "the defendant cannot ever show 
actual exposure or prejudicial effect unless the court allows the 
jury to be polled." State v. Clark, 675 P.2d 557, 560 (Utah 1983). 
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In Clark, this Court held that "the tri al court must r i il e 
;r:i B matter nl l.r1 n " whether the publ inly is potenti al 1 y prejudicial 
or not prejudicial at all." Id, at 561. The trial judge did not 
make any such ruling in this case, instead s^aestepp • . 3 
! I pi e j u c l i c iti I l idluij c ol tin',' p u b l i c i t y incorrectly nil ing that 
: - defendant had not shown thnt* the reports reached the jury. 
Requiring -* trial iudg* -- ,1 basic 
tenet j. . , , . 
Neither Clark nor State v., Velasquez. 6"'2 F 2d 1254 tah 
1983' •> c I ) * *- r*-M.e , y wh*-'" * < • " 
,,-aKc ,^ initial determination d*< to prejudice -* *r east, 
* matter should be remanded t- * * -- to d e t o ^ 1 * ^ wnether "he 
wevpr 
mandate ,: Clark that •?• vriai adge conduct1 i~> inquiry as - t-
prejudiciai r ^  **-- c*f the media reports suggest. :> 
iii.iKe sue! : t.:.. ...J ."»n requires a new penal t\ ..-, JXUI^. 
The '"^ a'.e suggests that the publicity about shackling was 
not prejudic,7 ;< ; the shae!"1 I inq 0 :rii'i, >I.JM a p p r o p r i a t e . 
Contrary to . :* .issertion, i.i'i ,n t:s about, the nature of the argument 
regarding shackling - iny suggestion by the court that Mr., Yon ing 
- - ^ • - ; <--* ' i" Hiinqfrous 1 1 nr«uii!i in 1 he u n n t't :: :::)iri 
would ue highly prejudicial and should not reach the jury. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN NOT ALLOWING MR. YOUNG TO MAKE A 
STATEMENT TO THE JURY. 
A. THE DENIAL OF MR. YOUNG'S STATUTORY AND 
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO ALLOCUTION REQUIRES 
A NEW PENALTY HEARING. 
The State acknowledges that Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 77-35-22 (1980) provide a statutory 
right to allocution, but claims that denial of this right was 
harmless. State's brief at 34, 36-7. In Mohn v. State. 584 P.2d 40 
(Alaska 1978), the court remanded the case for resentencing where 
the trial court did not give the defendant the opportunity to make a 
statement at sentencing. The rule relied upon by the Alaska Supreme 
Court is virtually identical to Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.2 In rejecting the State's argument that the error was 
harmless, the court stated: 
The failure of the court below to address the 
defendant personally was not harmless error for, 
as we observed in Nattrass [v. State, 554 P.2d 
399 (Alaska 1976)] there is no substitute for the 
impact on sentencing which a defendant's own 
words might have if he chooses to make a 
statement. 
Id. at 44; see also People v. Emiq. 493 P.2d 368, 369-70 (Colo. 
1972) (trial court's failure to allow the defendant his right to 
allocution invalidates sentence). Numerous cases which acknowledge 
the existence of a statutory or constitutional right to allocution 
recognize thcit, where such right is violated, the proper remedy is 
reversal. See, e.g.. Tomlinson v. State, 647 P.2d 415, 417 (N*M. 
1982); State v. Nicoletti. 471 A.2d 613, 618 (R.I. 1984); In re 
2. The only difference between the relevant portions of the two 
rules is the article "the" instead of "an" before the word 
"opportunity" in the Alaska rule. 
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Stevens, 478 A.2d 212, 217 (Vt. 1984). 
Although the State claims that a federal due process right 
to allocution does not exist, it acknowledges that a number of 
courts have held that such a right does exis*" State's brief at 36; 
see, e.g., State v. Varnell, 450 N.W.2d 524 (Wis. App. 1989) ("At a 
sentencing hearing, one of the defendant's due process rights is to 
be present at the hearing and to be afforded the right to allocution 
(citations omitted)11); Ashe v. State, 586 F.£d 334 (4th Cir. 1978), 
cert, denied, 441 U.S. 966, 99 S.Ct. 2416, 60 L.Ed.2d 1072 (denial 
of due process occurs where trial judge fails to grant defendant's 
request to speak prior to sentencing). 
In making its argument that a due process right to 
allocution does not exist, the State fails to address the 
distinction which exists between failing to ^sk a defendant whether 
he has a statement to make and denying a request by a defendant for 
an opportunity to speak. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 
82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962); Ashe v. fftate, 568 F.2d 334 (4th 
Cir. 1978). The United States Supreme Court "has not yet decided 
whether silencing a defendant who wishes to speak" violates due 
process. LaFave, 3 Criminal Procedure, pp. 118-9. In McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 219, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711, 733 
(1971), the Court stated: 
This Court has not directly determined whether or 
to what extent the concept of due process of law 
requires that a criminal defendant wishing to 
present evidence or argument presumably relevant 
to the issues involved in sentencing should be 
permitted to do so. 
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Many of the cases cited by the State for the proposition 
that a due process right to allocution does not exist involve 
situations where a defendant has not affirmatively requested the 
opportunity to speak; many of these cases recognize the distinction 
and expressly reserve ruling on the issue of what procedure is 
required constitutionally where a defendant requests an opportunity 
to speak. See, e.g., United States v. Fleming. 849 F.2d 568, 570 
(1988) ("We need not decide what accommodation the district court 
might have been required to make to protect the defendant, had it 
been asked."); Lunz v. Henderson, 533 F.2d 1322, 1328 (1976); 
Loaan v. State. 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632, 646 (Md. 1981). 
Nor do all of the cases cited by the State for the 
proposition that a due process right to allocution does not exist 
reach such a conclusion. In Lunz. the court did not say that a due 
process right to allocution does not exist; instead, it held that 
the defendants rights to due process had not been violated under 
the circumstances of the case. 533 F.2d at 1328. In Logan v. 
State, 425 A,2d 632 (1981), the defendant did not raise the failure 
of the court to inform him of his statutory right to allocution in 
the trial court and the supreme court therefore refused to address 
the issue. 
In Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (Md. 1986), 
the court recognized that "the allocutory process provides a unique 
opportunity for the defendant himself to face the sentencing body" 
and concluded that reversible error occurs where a defendant is 
denied his right to allocution after asserting such right and making 
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a proffer. In Harris, the court traced the evolution of the right 
to allocution. Under the common law, allocution was an "essential 
procedural right/1 and the judge's failure t^ afford a criminal 
defendant the opportunity to speak at sentencing was reversible 
error, especially in capital cases. Id. at }.25. The right and its 
importance derived from the common law rule ^hat a criminal 
defendant could not testify in his own behalf. 
As judges attained more discretion in sentencing and 
criminal defendants obtained a right to counsel and to testify, the 
nature of the right to allocution changed. Vftiile the discretion of 
the sentencer works in favor of the continued importance of the 
right, the State is correct that a few jurisdictions have 
nevertheless determined that the right to counsel and to testify 
make any violation of the right to allocutior harmless error. Id. 
However, as set forth above, numerous other courts have 
recognized the continued vitality of the right and have held that 
reversible error occurs where a defendant's right to allocution is 
violated. See, e.g. , Mohn, 584 P.2d at 44; Ejmicr, 493 P.2d at 
369-70; Harris, 509 A.2d at 125. Allowing a capital defendant to 
make a statement to the sentencer where he requests to do so is an 
important aspect of due process. Failure to allow Mr. Young to make 
a statement to the jury requires a new penalty hearing. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF MR. YOUNG'S 
REQUEST THAT HE BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE 
A STATEMENT VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS. 
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The State did not directly address Mr. Young's argument 
that the unique nature of a death penalty case and the protections 
of the eighth amendment require that the defendant be allowed to 
make a statement to the jury. Appellant's opening brief at 51-2. 
At least one commentator has recognized the importance of a 
defendant's ability to make such a statement in the death penalty 
context. See Sullivan, Thomas J., The Capital Defendant's Right to 
Make a Personal Plea for Mercy; Common Law Allocution and 
Constitutional Mitigation, 15 N.M.L. Rev. 41, 56 (1985). 
Avoidance of the death penalty may largely rest 
on the jury's perception of the character and 
personal history of the defendant. Thus, an 
important aspect of the right to present 
mitigating evidence lies in the defense's ability 
to present the defendant to the jury in human 
terms. 
Id. "The defendant's appearance and testimony before the sentencing 
jury or judge often plays the most significant role in securing a 
favorable sentencing verdict*11 Id. at 41. 
The importance of mitigating evidence in a capital case and 
the eighth amendment requirement that a defendant be allowed to 
present unlimited mitigation emphasize the importance of the right 
to allocution and require that the failure to afford the defendant 
such right requires a new sentencing hearing. See generally 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1982) . 
The majority of the cases cited by the State for the 
proposition that a due process right to allocution does not exist do 
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not involve death penalty cases. See, e.g.. Logan v. State, 425 
A.2d 632 (Md. 1981); Lunz v. Henderson, 533 p.2d 1322 (1976); United 
States v. De La Paz, 698 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. tL983) ; United States v. 
Fleming, 849 F.2d 568 (11th Cir. 1988). Such decisions are 
therefore not applicable to Mr. Young's argument that the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments require that a capita] defendant be allowed to 
speak to the jury when he or she requests the opportunity to do so. 
Only two of the cases cited by the $tate in support of its 
argument that a constitutional right to allocpution does not exist 
were capital cases. Neither case discusses the effect of the eighth 
amendment requirement that a capital defendant be permitted to 
present unlimited mitigation. See People v. Gaines, 430 N.E.2d 
1046, 1062 (111. 1981); People v. Christiansen, 116 111. 2d 96, 506 
N.Ed.2d 1253, 1266-7 (111. 1987). 
In the present case, had the jury h^ard Mr. Young speak, 
listened to the words, and watched his body language and facial 
expressions, they may well have concluded theit aggravation did not 
outweigh mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt or that death was not 
the appropriate penalty. The trial court's failure to afford 
Mr. Young an opportunity to speak when requested requires a new 
penalty hearing. 
POINT IV. THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT TftE JURY THAT 
MERCY ARISING FROM MITIGATING EVIDENCE IS AN 
APPROPRIATE SENTENCING CONSIDERATION AND THE 
INCLUSION OF THE ANTI-SYMPATHY INSTRUCTION 
VIOLATED THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
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Feelings of mercy arising from the mitigating evidence are 
appropriate considerations in assessing the sentence in a death 
penalty case. See Appellant's opening brief at 55-7; People v. 
Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 193 (Colo. 1990). In the present case, in 
addition to giving an anti-sympathy instruction in the guilt phase, 
the trial judge instructed the jury during the penalty phase to rely 
on the guilt phase instructions "where applicable" and refused to 
give Mr. Young's requested "mercy" instruction. R. 850, 893, 894, 
910, 965. See Appellant's opening brief at 53-4. 
In Leaare v. State, 250 Ga. 875, 302 S.E.2d 351 (Ga. 1983), 
the court held that it was improper to give conflicting instructions 
which might have confused the jury and limited their 
"constitutionally required consideration of evidence in 
mitigation." The court stated: 
Thus this jury was charged to consider in 
mitigation all circumstances which in fairness or 
mercy offer a basis for not imposing the death 
penalty, a charge the substance of which is 
constitutionally required. But the jury was also 
charged not to base their verdict on sympathy for 
the defendant. Since the evidence in mitigation 
might well evoke sympathy, we find these charges 
in irreconcilable conflict. 
Leaare, 302 S.E.2d at 354. In Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1460 
(11th Cir. 1985), the court stated: 
Just as retribution is an appropriate 
justification for imposing a capital sentence 
(citation omitted), a jury may opt for mercy and 
impose life imprisonment at will. The ultimate 
power of the jury to impose life, no matter how 
egregious the crime or dangerous the defendant, 
is a tribute to the system's recognition of mercy 
as an acceptable sentencing rationale. 
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The failure to instruct the jury thit mercy was an 
appropriate consideration, coupled with the Misleading nature of the 
"anti-sympathy" instruction, requires a new penalty hearing, 
POINT V. THE PENALTY PHASE INSTRUCTIONS FAILED 
TO ADEQUATELY GUIDE THE JURY, 
In addition to failing to instruct the jury as to how to 
assess the second prong of the formula articulated in State v. Wood, 
648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981) (see Appellant's opening brief at 66-9), the 
trial judge erroneously precluded the jury fij-om considering any 
"lingering doubt" as to Mr. Young's guilt or the degree of the 
crime. See Penalty Phase Instruction No. 3, contained in Addendum A 
to this brief. 
The State is correct that in Franklijn v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 
164, 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (19188), the United States 
Supreme Court indicated that its prior decisions failed "to 
recognize a constitutional right to have sucW [lingering] doubts 
considered as a mitigating factor." The Cour^ t noted, however, that 
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180-2, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 
137 (1986), "stands for []the simple truism that where 'states are 
willing to allow defendants to capitalize on "residual doubts,"' 
such doubts will inure to the defendant's benefit." Franklin, 487 
U.S. at 173. 
Lingering doubt is an appropriate mitigating factor under 
California law. See People v. Coleman, 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1168, 80 
Cal. Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248, 254 (Cal. 1969)f People v. Thompson, 
45 Cal.3d 86, 134, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.^ d 37 (Cal. 1988); 
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People v. Farmer. 47 Cal.3d 888, 921 n.5, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 
P.2d 940, 961 (Cal. 1989) (defendant can argue his innocence in 
mitigation); People v, Murtishaw, 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1017, 258 Cal. 
Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d 172 (Cal. 1989). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1953 as amended) allows evidence 
to be presented during the sentencing phase as to the "nature and 
circumstances of the crime." This implicitly includes evidence of 
residual doubt as to guilt or the degree of culpability. See 
Farmer, 765 P.2d at 961 n.5. 
In addition, the statute explicitly allows "any other fact 
in mitigation of the penalty." Lingering doubt as to the degree of 
the crime or guilt of the defendant is mitigation evidence under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207. 
Finally, regardless of whether the eighth amendment 
guarantees a right to have lingering doubt considered as a 
mitigating factor, Article I section 9 of the Utah Constitution 
guarantees such a right. See State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 267 
(Utah 1986) . 
POINT VI. INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO DECIDE WHICH 
GUILT PHASE INSTRUCTIONS ARE APPLICABLE VIOLATED 
THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
Due process and the eighth amendment require the trial 
court to adequately instruct and channel the discretion of the jury 
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. See Appellant's 
opening brief at 70. Leaving it to the jury "to discern from the 
face of the guilt phase instructions which of them are inapplicable" 
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(State's brief at 51) fails to meet these constitutional 
requirements. 
POINT VII. THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS 
GIVEN DURING THE PENALTY PHASE VIOLATED THE 
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
In State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1148 (Utah 1989), 
Stewart, J. concurring, a majority of this Cqurt "criticized the 
definition of the reasonable doubt standard expressed in terms of 
making important or 'weighty' decisions in tr>e jurors' own lives." 
This Court noted that such a definition "tends to diminish and 
trivialize the constitutionally required burcien-of-proof standard 
[citations omitted]." Id. quoting State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1989) (Stewart, J. dissenting). Penally phase Instruction 
No. 8 and guilt phase Instruction No. 16 compared proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt to the weighty affairs in or^ e's life. R. 861, 
917-8 (see Addenda H and I to Appellant's opening brief). Although 
both instructions stated that the assurance m^st be greater than 
that which is normally reached in making weighty decisions, the 
comparison nevertheless trivialized the importance of the decision. 
See Johnson. 774 P.2d at 1148. 
The requirement that the doubt must *ot be speculative and 
that proof must satisfy the mind and convince the understanding tend 
to diminish the prosecution's burden of prooj Id.; see Cage v. 
Louisiana. 498 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) 
(per curiam) (reversing capital homicide conviction based on 
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction). In Addition, the 
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suggestion that doubt might arise from lack of evidence interferes 
with the presumption of evidence. Finally, none of the instructions 
give a workable definition of the concepts 
The failure to adequately instruct the jury regarding the 
concept of reasonable doubt requires a new trial. 
POINT VIII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO SUBMIT A GUILTY AND MENTALLY 
ILL VERDICT FORM TO THE JURY. 
Mr. Young's argument in this point is that the relevant 
statutes do not require a plea of insanity or defense of diminished 
capacity in order to submit a verdict form of guilty and mentally 
ill ("GAMI") to the jury, where the evidence supports such a 
verdict. See Appellant's opening brief at 98-104. 
State v. DePlontv. 749 P.2d 621 (Utah 1987), supports this 
position. In DePlontv, the defendant did not assert an insanity 
defense; instead, he asserted a defense of diminished capacity. 
DePlonty. 74 9 P.2d at 625. Although Rule 21.5, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure does not explicitly refer to the defense of 
diminished capacity, this Court read the Utah Insanity Defense Act 
as a whole, determining that a guilty and mentally ill verdict was 
appropriate even though DePlonty had asserted a defense of 
diminished capacity, not insanity. Id. 
It is Mr. Young's position that the analysis in DePlontv 
supports his argument that he need not assert either an insanity or 
diminished capacity defense in order to be entitled to a GAMI 
verdict form. In addition to allowing the GAMI verdict even though 
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Rule 21.5 does not refer to the defense of diminished capacity, 
DePlonty contains discussions which suggest that the verdict may be 
appropriate even though a defendant does not assert either defense. 
This Court stated in DePlonty: 
Furthermore, the trial court's interpretation of 
the Insanity Defense Act was incorrect. As 
defined by the Act, a defendant can be found 
mentally ill even though his mental illness does 
not entirely negate the mens rea of the crime 
charged. A defendant who suffers ftom a mental 
disease or~"defect and, therefore is 1 mentally ill 
as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2+305 and is 
found to possess the state of mind hecessary to 
commit the crime charged, despite his illness, 
should be found guilty and mentally|ill, as 
provided by the Act. 
Id. at 627 (emphasis in last sentence added) 
Insanity or diminished capacity and GAMI are distinct 
concepts. See State v. Baker. 440 N.W.2d 28^, 288 (S.D. 1989); 
DePlonty. 749 P.2d at 626; State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 296-7 
(Utah 1988). Insanity or diminished capacity negates the mens rea 
whereas "[a] judgment of guilty and mentally ill does not serve to 
exonerate or excuse the defendant; rather, trie offender found guilty 
and mentally ill is held accountable for his criminal conduct, yet 
because of his mental illness, may need specialized treatment." 
DePlonty. 749 P.2d at 626. In other words, C^ AMI applies when a 
criminal defendant can form the requisite mental state but is 
nevertheless mentally ill. Shickles, 760 P.2ki at 297. 
In DePlonty. although the defendant asserted a diminished 
capacity defense, the expert witnesses testified that Mr. DePlonty 
was capable of forming the requisite intent. The experts went on to 
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testify, however, that despite DePlonty's ability to form the 
intent, he was mentally ill. 
Mentally ill criminal defendants who are capable of forming 
the requisite intent should not be required to plead a legal fiction 
of insanity or diminished capacity, where they know the evidence 
will not support such a defense, in order to receive the benefit of 
a guilty and mentally ill verdict. Neither the Insanity Defense Act 
nor fairness requires such a result. 
The effect of a guilty and mentally ill verdict is to 
require the trial court to hold a hearing to determine the present 
mental state of the defendant and hospitalize the defendant if the 
constitutional criteria in Rule 21.5(4) are met. See State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988). In a capital case, such 
a verdict should also serve as a mitigating circumstance, and the 
jury instructed as to its meaning and effect. See Sanders v. State, 
585 A.2d 117, 134-5 (Del. 1990). 
Failing to instruct a sentencing jury as to the effect of a 
GAMI verdict results in the arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 
Sandersf 585 A.2d at 133. The Sanders court was concerned that 
although a defendant's mental illness might "greatly weaken the 
justification for capital punishment," 
Unless the jury is required to focus upon 
the significance of its modified finding of 
guilty there is an unacceptable risk that a 
defendant such as Sanders would receive the same 
punishment as that imposed on a defendant after 
an ordinary verdict of guilty. 
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Accordingly, in order for th^ 
constitutionality of the guilty but mentally ill 
statute to be upheld, it is essential that the 
judge instructing the jury in the punishment 
phase of a capital case advise the jury 
concerning the mitigating effect of a finding of 
guilty but mentally ill, as contrasted with the 
findings implicit in an ordinary guilty verdict. 
At a minimum, it would appear that this would 
require that the jury be instructed that a 
finding of guilty but mentally ill establishes 
mitigation as a matter of law . . . I. 
Id. at 34. 
In the present case, the jury was not given the opportunity 
to reach a GAMI verdict; nor were they instructed as to the 
mitigating effect of such a verdict resulting in the arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty, in violatior of the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments. 
In addition, although the United States Supreme Court has 
not addressed the issue of "whether a death ^ntence imposed upon 
any mentally ill defendant would be valid" (1^. at 135), authority 
exists for finding such a sentence invalid where the defendant is 
mentally ill. See Sanders, 585 A.2d at 135. 
The Sanders court pointed out that: 
[t]he retributive value of capital punishment is 
closely tied to the defendant's culpability. 
Thus, while the death penalty may in some 
instances be an "acceptable expression of 
society's moral outrage at particularly offensive 
conduct [citation omitted]," it cannot be imposed 
without regard to the defendant's "personal 
responsibility and moral guilt [citation 
omitted]." 
Where a defendant is mentally ill, his moral culpability is not on 
par with that of a defendant of a sounder mind. See Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 76-1-104 (1953 as amended) (purpose of criminal statutes is to 
distinguish various degrees of culpability and not be oppressive). 
In the present case, the evidence established that 
Mr. Young suffered from a mental illness. R. 1036:43, 45, 48. The 
State presented no evidence to the contrary. See DePlonty, 749 P.2d 
at 627. Under such circumstances, the failure to give the jury a 
guilty and mentally ill verdict form violated the Insanity Defense 
Act and the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The error requires 
reversal of both phases of the trial since the jury was not given 
the opportunity during the guilt/innocence phase to determine 
whether critical mitigation existed. 
POINT XIV. THE STATE'S REFERENCE TO EVIDENCE 
WHICH WAS NOT ADMITTED REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
The State does not argue that the prosecutor's remarks and 
questions were proper, nor does it apparently argue that the error 
was not plain. Instead, the State takes the position that any 
improper conduct was harmless. State's brief at 68-9. Contrary to 
the State's claim, the comments and testimony permeated the entira 
proceedings in this case with the suggestion that a multitude of 
additional evidence existed in this case. See Appellant's opening 
brief at 104-109. 
POINT XVIII. THE FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE LAW 
REGARDING THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS RESULTED IN 
A JURY VENIRE OF VOLUNTEERS WHO DID NOT REPRESENT 
A FAIR CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY AND FORCED 
MR. YOUNG TO CHOSE BETWEEN HIS RIGHT TO AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
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Mr. Young acknowledges that the Martch 1989 panel was not 
used to select his jury. He continues to complain regarding that 
panel, however, because of the failure of the court and the State to 
subsequently comprise a statutory and constitutionally adequate 
panel after it was demonstrated from the Mai^ ch panel statistics that 
the methods being used were not comporting wjith the statutes and 
were not producing a fair cross section of the community. The delay 
caused by the State and the court's failure to select a jury panel 
in compliance with statute forced Mr. Young to choose between his 
rights under the United States and Utah constitutions to a speedy 
trial as codified in the Disposition of Detainer Against Prisoners 
and his right to a jury selection process th^t satisfied the United 
States and Utah constitutions as to an impartial jury and due 
process of law. See Simmons v. United Statefe, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 
8S S.Ct. 961, 19 lj.Ed.2ti 1241, 1259 (196S) (Refusing to require a 
defendant to choose between his fourth and f^fth amendment rights 
under the United States Constitution). 
The State argues in its reply that %he venire of 
seventy-seven persons summoned for the defendant's trial is not 
required to be a fair cross section of the cpmmunity. This 
assertion is incorrect. In Holland v. Illinois. 493 U.S. 474, 110 
S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 916 (1990), the ifnited States Supreme 
Court acknowledged a sixth amendment requirement of a fair 
cross section on the venire as a means of assuring the impartial 
jury that the Constitution demands. The courft in that case 
specifically held that racial groups cannot be excluded from the 
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venire from which a jury is selected. Id. at 916. See also 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. ,, 111 S.Ct. , 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 
(1991). 
The State argues that Mr. Young has shown no prejudice 
resulting from the court's failure to follow the jury selection 
act. The defendant maintains that he was prejudiced because he was 
tried and convicted by an essentially volunteer self-selected jury 
not chosen from a fair cross section of the community which 
eventually imposed upon him the maximum penalty allowed by law. 
There is old Utah authority that a conviction by an illegally 
constituted jury is null. State v. Bates, 22 Utah 65, 61 P. 905 
(Utah 1900). Today, if the impossible showing of evidence-based 
prejudice is required in a capital case to challenge the illegality 
of the jury selection process, the right to due process of law is 
null. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195, 67 S.Ct. 
261, 265, 91 L»Ed. 181 (1946) ("Reversible error does not depend on 
a showing of prejudice in an individual case. The evil lies in the 
admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in the community in 
disregard of the prescribed standards of jury selection . . . The 
injury is not limited to the defendant—there is injury to the jury 
system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large and 
to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.11). 
POINT XX. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO REMOVE JURORS FOR CAUSE. 
The State cites Ross v. Oklahoma, U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 
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2273 (1988), and apparently is arguing that ftoss somehow affects 
theissue of whether reversible error occurs when a criminal 
defendant is forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror 
who should have been removed for cause. Ros$, however is 
inapplicable since its holding is explicitly based on an Oklahoma 
law regarding the use of peremptory challenges which is very 
different from Utah law. 
In Ross, the United States Supreme (fcourt determined that 
Oklahoma law which limited the exercise of peremptory challenges by 
requiring that the defendant use his peremptc>ries to cure erroneous 
denials of challenges for cause did not violate the sixth and 
fourteenth amendments unless a juror who should have been removed 
for cause actually sits on the jury. 
By contrast, Utah law does not require the use of 
peremptory challenges to cure erroneous denials of challenges for 
cause; instead, Utah law requires a new trial where a defendant is 
required to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should 
have been removed for cause. See State v. Gc^tschall, 782 P.2d 459 
(Utah 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989). 
In State v. Julian, a post-Ross case|, this Court stated: 
This Court has repeatedly held that it is 
prejudicial error to compel a party to exercise a 
peremptory challenge to remove a prospective 
juror who should properly have been removed for 
cause. [footnote omitted] 
This repeated holding is grounded on Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which this Court quoted immediately following 
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the above statement in Julian, and Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Virtually all of the cases cited in footnote 11 in support 
of this proposition in Julian refer to Rule 18, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and/or Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution as the basis for this holding. See, e.g., State v. 
Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987) (citing Article I, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14) 
[without referring to the sixth or fourteenth amendments] in support 
of holding that prejudicial error occurs when trial court refuses to 
dismiss juror for cause, thereby requiring defendant to use 
peremptory challenge); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 767-88 (Utah 1980). Utah law, not 
the sixth and fourteenth amendments, is the consistent basis for 
this repeated holding. 
In State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. App. 1989), the 
court rejected the State's argument that Ross v. Oklahoma required 
that a case not be reversed unless a juror who should have been 
excused for cause actually sat on the jury. The Sexton court 
focused on the Ross court's reliance on Oklahoma's law which 
requires that a defendant use his peremptory challenges to remove 
jurors who should have been removed for cause, and pointed out: 
Our case differs from Ross. Unlike Oklahoma, 
Arizona law does not require a defendant to use 
peremptory challenges to cure a trial court's 
erroneous refusal to strike a juror for cause. 
The rule in Arizona is that the right to 
- 30 -
peremptory challenges is so substantial that 
forcing a party to use a peremptory challenge to 
strike potential jurors who should have been 
stricken for cause denies the litigant a 
substantial right* [citations omitted]. 
Sexton, 787 P.2d at 1099. See also State v. Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1991) (pet. cert pending). 
Furthermore, Ross explicitly left open the issue of whether 
the sixth and fourteenth amendments are violated where a state does 
not have a limitation on the exercise of peremptory challenges 
similar to that of Oklahoma. The court stated: 
We need not decide the broader question whether, 
in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the 
"right" to exercise peremptory challenges, "a 
denial or impairment" of the exercise of 
peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant 
uses one or more challenges to remo^ jurors who 
should have been removed for cause. [citations 
omitted] 
Ross v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. at 91 n.4. 
The reversible nature of this type pf error is well 
established and not affected by Ross. 
The State also claims that Mr. Youn^ selectively analyzed 
the jurors7 responses and that the jurors all "expressed willingness 
to follow the law and act impartially" so no error occurred. 
This Court has recognized that "[a] statement made by a 
prospective juror that he intends to be fair and impartial loses its 
meaning in light of other testimony or facts that suggest bias." 
State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 26. See also St^ ate v. Pike, 712 P.2d 
277, 280 (Utah 1985) (juror may not be able t}o recognize influence 
- 31 -
of improper contacts); People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80 (Cal. 
App. 4 Dist. 1984) (recognition that statement regarding ability to 
deliberate impartially is self-serving). 
The specific arguments selected by the State to demonstrate 
the impartiality of the contested jurors actually support 
Mr. Young's argument. State's brief at 90-93. The quote attributed 
to Mr. Cole suggests that in a "gruesome death," he would not take a 
"second look" to assess whether the death penalty is appropriate. 
See State's brief at 90. 
Ms. Bauman indicated that she believed that in the case of 
any intentional killing, the death penalty would be appropriate. 
She also indicated that the facts of the case, not the mitigation 
evidence, is what would be important to her decision. Id. 
R. 104 6:183. Defense counsel asked a number of follow-up questions, 
only one of which is the question, taken out of context, which is 
quoted by the State on page 91 of its brief. The questions of 
defense counsel were not misleading when the entire voir dire is 
reviewed. The questions were merely an attempt to clarify for the 
parties and trial judge the nature of Ms. Bauman's opinions. In 
addition, the State's claims about Ms. Bauman's demeanor and its 
attempts to attribute certain thoughts and motivation to Ms. Bauman 
are not found in the record and are simply speculation. 
Ms. Petrogeorge's inability to consider mitigation evidence 
when someone kills repeatedly (R. 1026:71) and her other statements 
outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 15 were not undone by her 
statements that she would follow the court's instructions. 
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The statement made by Ms. Raddon wh|.ch the State quotes on 
pages 92-3 of its brief support Mr. Young7s argument that she could 
not be fair and consider mitigating evidence where a person had 
killed before. Her views were strong and ba^ed on personal opinion, 
not a misunderstanding of the law. 
The trial judge committed reversible error in failing to 
remove these four jurors. 
POINT XXI. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN REMOVING JUROR HOFFMAN. 
In order to properly be excused for cause, a juror's views 
must "prevent or substantially impair performance of his duties as a 
juror." Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Cft. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 
(1980); Wainwriaht v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 
841 (1985). Reversible error, in violation Of due process and the 
eighth amendment, occurs when the trial court; excludes a juror in 
violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U»S. 510. 88 S.Ct. 1770, 
20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). 
The eighth and fourteenth amendment« require that the 
discretion of the sentencing body be carefu^j channeled and that 
there be a meaningful basis for imposing the death penalty. See 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 
398 (1980); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U,S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 
49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). Various decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, read together, establish that life imprisonment, not 
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the death penalty, is the presumed sentence in a capital homicide 
case. See Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1988). Juror 
Hoffman's preference for a life sentence reflects this presumption 
of life and was not a proper basis for exclusion. 
Nor did Juror Hoffman's change in birth control pills 
create a mental or physical infirmity which rendered her incapable 
of sitting as a juror. A "hormonal imbalance" could be attributed 
to almost any person at some point in his or her life, and does not 
amount to an inability to sit as a juror. 
POINT XXIII. THE INCORRECT REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION GIVEN DURING THE GUILT PHASE VIOLATED 
DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
The United States Supreme Court issued its per curiam 
decision in Cage v. Louisiana. 498 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. , 112 
L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), after Mr. Young filed his opening brief. In 
Cage, the Court reversed a capital homicide conviction based on an 
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction. See discussion supra at 
20-21. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Young respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial* Alternatively, 
- 34 -
Mr. Young requests that this Court reverse the death sentence and 
remand the case for a new penalty hearing. 
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